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INTRODUCTION
Imitation is no longer the sincerest form of flattery. Just ask Jessica. Jessica, 17, was
enjoying her final carefree days as a high school senior in Minnesota when she discovered that
there was someone purporting to be her on social media – same name, same picture, same
biography.1 That Jessica, however, was much darker. She was posting pornographic content,
pushing Canadian real estate, and pitching Ghanaian cryptocurrency. The real Jessica immediately
reported the account to Twitter, but it would take two years for the platform’s security algorithm
to finally flag and suspend the account.2 The following year, the New York Attorney General took
an unprecedented step and became the first state authority to hold the “troll factory”3 responsible
for digital deception accountable for stealing and selling personal data from 55,000 people,
including minors.4 Unfortunately, this cautionary tale came too late.
Two weeks after Jessica publicly shared her ordeal with The New York Times, the United
States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment alleging Russian “specialists”5 at a factory
called Internet Research Agency (“IRA”) had stolen the identities of 87 million Facebook users6
with the help of a political data mining firm associated with the Trump campaign, Cambridge

1

Nicholas
Confessore
et
al.,
The
Follower
Factory,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2018),
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html.
2
Id.
3
The term refers to large, centralized units that focus on producing disinformation and participating on social media.
See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Inside the Russian Troll Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/russia-troll-factory.html (explaining the mechanics of the Russian
government’s largest troll factory).
4
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Groundbreaking Settlement with Sellers of Fake Followers and “Likes” on Social
Media (January 30, 2019), www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-groundbreakingsettlement-sellers-fake-followers.
5
See United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., No. 1: 18-cr-00032-DLF, 2018 WL 914777 (D.D.C. filed Feb.
16, 2018).
6
David Patrikarakos, In ‘Targeted,’ Data is the Precious Coin of the Realm of Digital Robber Barons, WASH. POST
(Oct. 11, 2019), www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/in-targeted-data-is-the-precious-coin-of-the-realm-of-digitalrobber-barons/2019/10/11/f1cff630-eaa0-11e9-9306-47cb0324fd44_story.html.

Realistically Revaluating Social Media Data Protections

2

Analytica.7 The operation had comprised a database consisting of five thousand data points on
every Facebook user in the United States over the age of eighteen.8 The factory employed
behavioral and clinical psychologists9 who sorted and fed the data to bots who then targeted users
with divisive conspiratorial messages.10 Masquerading as Americans, “specialists” worked in
twelve hour shifts and were required to make 80 comments and 20 shares on Twitter and
Facebook11 in multiple languages.12 The mandatory quota was orchestrated to take advantage of
the algorithms of the social network sites (“SNSs”),13 to ensure each divisive post would be
classified as a “trend”14 and placed it on a prominent list capturing the attention of a large audience
for a short period of time.15 The goal was to impair, obstruct and defeat “the lawful governmental
functions of the United States,” including the 2016 U.S. presidential election.16 And impair they
did. In the last three months of the U.S. presidential election, “fake news” generated almost 120%
more shares, reactions, and comments on Facebook than actual current event coverage.17
Social media has shifted from being a niche “social” activity to a democratized daily deluge

7

Andy Greenberg, Mueller Indictment: Russian Trolls Stole Real US Identities to Fool Facebook, WIRED (Feb. 29,
2018), www.wired.com/story/russian-trolls-identity-theft-mueller-indictment/.
8
Patrikarakos, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See MacFarquhar, supra note 3.
12
See Ashley Nicolas, Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of
Disinformation on Social Media, 107 GEO L.J. ONLINE 36, 44 (2018).
13
See Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUT.
MEDIATED COMMUN. 210, 211 (2007) (defining SNSs as “web-based services that allow individuals to: [1] construct
a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, [2] articulate a list of other users with whom they share a
connection, and [3] view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system" and
explaining that "[t]he nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site”).
14
Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 52 (2017).
15
Sitaram Asur et al., Trends in Social Media: Persistence and Decay, ARXIV (2011).
16
See Internet Research Agency, supra note 5.
17
Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on
Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016), www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-electionnews-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook.
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of news and activity.18 Far from America’s initial conception of a “marketplace of ideas,”19 SNSs
today are stacked with “fake news,” disinformation20 and misinformation.21 Now, a relatively
small number of individuals can disseminate massive amounts of “fake news,”22 manipulate real
news23 in real-time,24 and even develop doctored audio and visual news,25 all with a standard
camera and laptop. Initially conceived as a communication medium for a select portion of the
population,26 SNSs currently count 3.5 billion users,27 with 288 million new users joining in the
past year alone.28 As of January 1, 2019, 45% of the world’s population are on SNSs, with North
America reporting the largest overall usage rate of 88.1% of the total population.29 Within these
swelling numbers are also the growing population of fake accounts, “bots,” originating from “troll

18

Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 889-91 (2006) (describing the Internet as a means to “a worldwide gossip
mall” and positing that “[p]rivate individuals did not possess or have access to instruments for widely disseminating
information”).
19
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining that “when men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . . the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market”).
20
Michael Landon-Murray et al., Disinformation in Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy: Impacts and Ethics in an Era
of Fake News, Social Media, and Artificial Intelligence, 21 PUB. INTEGRITY 512, 513 (defining disinformation as
“intentionally false information to serve an objective”).
21
Landon-Murray et al., supra note 20 (defining as “simply incorrect information”).
22
MATTHEW BAUM ET AL., COMBATING FAKE NEWS (2017).
23
Alina Selyukh, Hackers Send Fake Market-Moving AP Tweet on White House Explosions, REUTERS (Apr. 31,
2013), www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usa-whitehouse-ap/hackers-send-fake-market-moving-ap-tweet-on-whitehouse-explosions-idUSBRE93M12Y20130423 (reporting the official @AP Twitter account was hacked and tweeted
that two explosions at the White House injured President Obama, causing U.S. markets to plunge).
24
@BuzzFeed, You Won’t Believe What Obama Says in this Video!, TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018),
www.twitter.com/buzzfeed/status/986257991799222272?.
25
Supasorn Suwajanakorn et al., Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 36 ACM TRANS. GRAPH. (2017)
(highlighting how students used A.I. to create visually convincing videos of President Obama saying things he had
said before in a completely different context by feeding a neural network seventeen hours of footage from former
addresses as ‘training data’).
26
Simon Kemp, Digital 2019: Global Internet Use Accelerates, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 30, 2019),
www.wearesocial.com/blog/2019/01/digital-2019-global-internet-use-accelerates.
27
David Meltzer, Combating the Millennial Attention Span to Keep Your Team Engaged, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 4,
2017), www.entrepreneur.com/article/297833.
28
Id.
29
Kemp, supra note 26.
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factories.” About 15% of Twitters active accounts, totaling 48 million, have been reported as fake30
and Facebook has reported roughly 60 million fake accounts.31
From “fakes news” to filter bubbles, the Internet seems to be broken and the growing
consensus32 is that SNSs are to blame.33 As the digital disease spreads, the deception devolves,34
exacerbating extremist points of view courtesy of massive personal data breaches35 used by
increasingly realistic bots creating the appearance of public support.36 The finely-tuned algorithms
amplify extreme and outrageous speech37 by manipulating common cognitive biases38 and
addicting us to the chaos.39 With the arrival of “deep fakes,” which allow audio and visual

30

Onur Varol et al., Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization, ARXIV (2017).
Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions, Hearing Before the
Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism, 115th Cong. 134 (2017) (statement of Colin Stretch, Vice
President and General Counsel, Facebook.
32
2019 Trust Barometer, EDELMAN (Jan. 30, 2019) (finding 73% of people worry about fake news being used as a
weapon and only 43% trust social media as a reliable source of information).
33
See, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH (2017); JONATHAN
TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND
UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY (2017); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) (2011).
34
In 2016, one IRA “specialist” made an average of 2,442 Facebook posts a month. In 2019, IRA Facebook posts
have tripled, averaging 8,900 posts in October alone, yielding more than 9.7 million interactions by over 1.7 million
accounts. There is also evidence the IRA and other factories are now leveraging local individuals as proxies to create
and post content and even paying to rent their social media accounts to do the same. See e.g., Shelby Grossman et
al., Stanford University Internet Observatory, Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence Operations in Africa (Oct. 29,
2019); Davey Alba & Sheera Frenkel, Russia Tests New Disinformation Tactics in Africa to Expand Influence, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/russia-facebook-disinformation-africa.html.
35
Confessore et al., supra note 1.
36
Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018),
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/.
37
Molly J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 769, 771 (2017) (“[O]utrage-inducing
content appears to be more prevalent and potent online than offline”).
38
Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCI. 1146, 1150 (2018) (Finding in a
SNSs study that "Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all
categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news . . . human behavior
contributes more to the differ- ential spread of falsity and truth than automated robots do.").
39
Kasey Panetta, Top Strategic Predictions for 2018 and Beyond, GARTNER (Oct. 3, 2017),
www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-strategic-predictions-for-2018-and-beyond ("[By 2022] the
majority of individuals in mature economies will consume more false information than true information.”).
31
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manipulation of real people,40 the Internet is about to become much more insane. As one scholar
says, “[T]hink of it as a destructive variation of the Turing test: imitation designed to mislead and
deceive rather than to emulate and iterate.”41
The ‘Internet Age’ of today is arguably the most profound transformation of information
since the invention of the printing press. Whereas oil fueled the factories of the Industrial Age,
personal data42 is driving a veritable artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) arms race43 and the United
States, with its inadequate privacy protections,44 is the Wild West. SNSs have amassed massive
reserves of users’ personal data, some of which they pawn off on a veritable black market to
“behind the scenes actors”45 and some of which third parties simply steal.46 It has become clear

40

Samantha Cole, There is No Tech Solution to Deepfakes, VICE (Aug. 26, 2018),
www.vice.com/en_us/article/594qx5/there-is-no-tech-solution-to-deepfakes.
41
Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 30, 2019).
42
Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech
Regulation, 51 U.C.D. L. Rᴇᴠ 1149, 1154 (2017).
43
American companies alone are estimated to have spent over $19 billion in 2018 acquiring and analyzing consumer
data. See Louise Matsakis, The Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED (Feb. 13, 2019),
www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection/. For example. Google has made more than a dozen AI
and robotics acquisitions, spending $500 million alone on the purchase of DeepMind, a British AI development
company that defines its mission as “solv[ing] intelligence” by combining “the best techniques from machine
learning and systems neuroscience to build powerful general-purpose learning algorithms,” see, e.g., Dan Rowinski,
Google’s Game Of Moneyball In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence, READWRITE (Jan. 29, 2014),
www.readwrite.com/2014/01/29/google-artificial-intelligence-robots-cognitive-computing-moneyball/;
Ingrid
Lunden, Google’s DeepMind Acqui-Hires Two AI Teams In The UK, Partners With Oxford, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24,
2014),
www.social.techcrunch.com/2014/10/23/googles-deepmind-acqui-hires-two-ai-teams-in-the-uk-partnerswith-oxford/; Adam Clark Estes, Meet Google’s Robot Army. It’s Growing., GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2014),
www.gizmodo.com/a-humans-guide-to-googles-many-robots-1509799897.
44
See infra Parts III.B.1-3.
45
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Opening Remarks at PrivacyCon 2017 (Jan. 12, 2017),
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/privacycon-2017-part-1/ftc_privacycon_2017__transcript_segment_1
.pdf (discussing the increasing number of “behind the scenes” companies gathering personal data); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014),
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-tradecommission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (discussing how data brokers obtain consumer information).
46
See, e.g., Lily Newman, Twitter Puts Profit Ahead of User Privacy—Just Like Facebook Did Before, WIRED (Oct.
2, 2019), www.wired.com/story/twitter-two-factor-advertising/ (reporting 32.8 million Twitter credentials may have
been leaked); BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/technology-47812470 (reporting on authorities finding
a “massive cache of data on unsecured Amazon servers used by a Mexican social media firm”); Paul Grewal, Deputy
Vice President and General Counsel, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook, FACEBOOK
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that personal data is really the price that must be paid for use of the ‘free’ platforms.47 Through
manipulation of primal behaviors,48 SNSs promote personal freedom of expression while
simultaneously constraining and commodifying their users,49 thereby making personal privacy
become a paradox.50 In a democracy with easily accessible anonymity,51 bad actors face no reallife consequences for their digital deceptions 52 and there is no A.I. algorithmic accountability.53
Conversely, individuals’ SNSs data is somehow seeping from the digital realm to the real world.
Colleges are collecting data about prospective students,54 stores are employing statisticians to sift
through data to predict purchases,55 health insurance companies are relying on data to determine

(Mar. 16, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytica/ (reporting Cambridge
Analytica exposed private user information by violating Facebook’s privacy platform); In addition to violations of
privacy protocols, Facebook and Twitter have recently reported hackers have intentionally infiltrated their 'private'
networks. See Guy Rosen, Vice President of Product Management, Security Update, FACEBOOK (Sept. 28, 2018),
www.newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/security-update/(reporting that hackers exploited a vulnerability in
Facebook’s code affecting nearly 50 million accounts); Kate Conger et al., Former Twitter Employees Charged with
Spying for Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/technology/twitter-saudiarabia-spies.html (reporting on how Saudi Arabian spies rose through the ranks of Twitter accessing “personal
information and account data of Twitter customers that included users’ telephone numbers and I.P. addresses”).
47
Mary Madden & George Gao, Privacy and Cybersecurity: Key Findings, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 16, 2015),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/16/privacy/ (reporting 91% of Americans say they have lost control over
how personal information is collected with only 2% viewing them as “very secure”).
48
See infra Part II.
49
See, DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 6
(2007) ("[A]s people use the freedom-enhancing dimensions of the Internet, as they express themselves and engage
in self-development, they may be constraining the freedom and self-development of others – and even of
themselves.”).
50
Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Mar. 27, 2018), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-socialmedia-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns (“When it comes to algorithms that underpin the social media environment,
users’ comfort level with sharing personal information depends heavily on how and why their data are being used.”).
51
Kasey Panetta, Top Strategic Predictions for 2018 and Beyond, GARTNER (Oct. 3, 2017),
www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-strategic-predictions-for-2018-and-beyond (predicting by 2022,
the majority of individuals in mature economies will consume more false information than true information).
52
Eric Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity and Online Policing, Global Comm’n on Internet
Governance Paper Series, No. 21 (September 30, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2667711.
53
See infra Parts III.B.1-3.
54
Douglas MacMillan & Nick Anderson, Student Tracking, Secret Scores, WASH. POSt (Oct. 2, 2019),
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/14/colleges-quietly-rank-prospective-students-based-their-personaldata (finding forty-four universities collecting data by tracking Web activity and then assigning predictive scores of
likelihood of enrolling).
55
Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30 (discovering Target employed
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the appropriate level of care,56 and prisons are deferring to algorithmic assessments regarding
prisoners’ bail.57 All of which, currently, is perfectly legal in the United States.58
This paper seeks to develop a viable framework in response to these digital developments
that secures personal social media data by first recalibrating the concept of personal privacy and
then reconceptualizing it as property. Part II explains the science reinforcing the symbiotic,
cyclical relationship between individuals and SNS platforms, the core of which is the reward
center. As naturally social animals, humans have certain primal needs and SNSs afford unlimited
access to their fulfillment while simultaneously increasing their own profits. The net result of this
relationship

has

affectively

commodified

users,59

without

SNSs

providing

any

compensation.60Advances in A.I., from trained algorithms to the more advanced self-learning
neural networks, have afforded SNSs unprecedent access to audiences in depth and breadth,
allowing for innovative and insidious means of user manipulation.
Part III address the paradox of privacy in regard to devising, implementing, and enforcing
it as a legal right, particularly in a nation with competing equities. From its inception, the

statisticians to sift through buying records of women who had signed up for baby registries and then assigning them
a pregnancy prediction score).
56
Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018),
www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy (reporting health
insurance companies using Internet data tracking tools, called “instruments,” used in informing decisions about care).
57
See generally Fred Cate & Jane Winn, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROT. IN
AGE OF “INFO. ECON.” 37 (2006) (reporting an increasing number of jurisdictions are transitioning away from a
monetary system to one dependent on risk-assessment algorithms).
58
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment. (“The inclusive description of
'documents' is revised to accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data
compilations. . . ."). See generally Gordon Gottsegen & Josie Colt, How to Delete Your Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
and Snapchat, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2018), www.wired.com/story/how-to-delete-your-facebook-instagram-twittersnapchat.
59
See generally Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. (1980) (explaining modern day privacy
infringements manifest in the commodification of individuals).
60
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 (2006) (advocating the
use of property rights to protect privacy on the Internet).
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amorphous concept of ‘privacy’ has been a reactionary afterthought in the American legal
system.61 The inherent tension in developing effective privacy laws in the United States for a fastmoving digital frontier is a foundational tension. The delineation between promoting collective
progress62 versus protecting individual determinism63 is a precarious proposition. However, as
SNSs continue to cross personal boundaries, using and misusing neuroscience to recklessly
manipulate and profit off of their users,64 the need to recalibrate antiquated regulatory processes
with shifting social norms is crucial.65 Part III provides a snapshot of where three government
⎯the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Congress, and the Supreme Court. currently stand on
the issue of personal data privacy protections, providing insight into the current shortcomings of
preexisting protections today.
Taking into account the science of SNSs, the contextual complexity of privacy protections,
and the current, respective structural institutional constraints, Part IV proposes reconceptualizing
personal social media data as private property. Reclassifying this digital data as personal property
accurately reflects the psychology discussed in Part II and overcomes the challenges of Part III as
it allows for definitive institutional and ideological parameters to be developed and applied. From
this framework, recasting SNSs as information fiduciaries more accurately encapsulates the role
of similarly situated others. Further, under this re-conception, the structurally solid, but rigid, legal
institutions would have to make minimal changes within the preconceived property frameworks
61

See infra Parts III.B.1-3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).
63
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”)
64
See infra Parts II.A.-B.
65
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L.
& TECH. (2014).
62
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and arguably would be more effective in their ex post roles.
I. THE SYMBIOTIC SCIENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A.I. advancements have enhanced SNSs’ effectiveness in engaging users, but the driving
force to their success is the neurological need to intimate and socialize.66 SNSs’ continued success
and profitability depend on scalability, which is driven by A.I. algorithms fueled by personal user
data.67 The more photos, videos, text, and audio users upload to SNSs, the more A.I. algorithms
learn to “see”68 what interests the individual user and the “smarter” these algorithms become. In
turn, as timelines and newsfeeds become increasingly personalized69 and user engagement is
exponentially enhanced,70 the A.I. algorithms reach a tipping point at which they no longer have
to wait for the individual to feed them data, they can infer predicative individual behaviors on their

See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells that Read Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, F00001 (“The human brain has multiple
mirror neuron systems that specialize in carrying out and understanding not just the actions of others but their
intentions, the social meaning of their behavior and their emotions.”); See also, Kelly Dickerson et al., The Role of
the Human Mirror Neuron System in Supporting Communication in a Digital World, 8 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 698 (2017).
67
See Bruce Schneier, A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data, 8 IEEE SEC. & PRIV'Y 88 (Jul. 26, 2010),
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/11/a_taxonomy_of_s.html (defining "data" as: personal information given to
SNSs that is required for individuals to register, information personally posted by users on SNSs' platforms, and
personal information that is hidden from plain sight, but is collected by SNSs regarding individuals' activity on their
platform).
68
Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 2, 2016) (explaining the Facebook algorithm assigns
a “relevancy” score to every post it could possibly show a particular user at a particular point in time).
69
Oremus, supra note 65 (“Once every possible post in your feed has received its relevancy score, the sorting
algorithm can put them in the order that you’ll see them on the screen. The post you see at the top, then, has been
chosen over thousands of others as the one most likely to make you laugh, cry, smile, click, like, share, or comment.”).
70
Id. (“[C]licks, likes, shares, and comments are what make posts go viral, turn individual users into communities,
and drive traffic to the advertisers that Facebook relies on for revenue.”).
66
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own.71 Thus, the capabilities of SNSs today are truly difficult to understate.72 Section A discusses
the science propelling people to use SNSs and explain why engagement continues to increase in
spite of privacy violations and deception. Section B reviews how SNSs have created code that
mirrors and manipulates the human needs discussed in Section A and, thereby, have increased
engagement and revenues.
A. The Individual
The role individuals play in the digital ecosystem, as both producers and consumers of
personal information, is crucial to the success of SNSs.73 Afterall, humans are posting the content
and creating the data, not the SNSs.74 Thus, it is important to understand what compels individuals
to post.
Humans are naturally social beings with a fundamental need to belong and an inherent
desire for social status.75 Over time, the human brain has evolved neural wiring that rewards

71

A.I. analyzes diverse, rich user data and assigns it unpredictable values in order to infer user preferences, sensitive
attributes (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation), and opinions (e.g., political stances), or to predict behaviors (e.g.,
to serve advertisements). See Brent Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, 3 BIG DATA &
SOC'Y 1–2 (2016). See, e.g., Google Search Changes Tackle Fake News and Hate Speech, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25,
2017), www.bbc.com/news/technology-39707642 (“Facebook announced it had begun to assign each of its users a
reputation score, predicting their trustworthiness on a scale from zero to one. The methodology behind its scoring is
unclear. Google has added new metrics to its ranking systems that should help to stop false information from entering
the top results for particular search terms. Twitter is also assessing a user’s reputation for credibility by the behavior
of others in a person’s network as a risk factor in judging whether a person’s tweets should be spread.”).
72
Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2017),
www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news.
73
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 65.
74
Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 100 (“We live in an age in which many of us privately
maintain records or record fragments on one another. Through peer-produced social networking services like
Facebook or MySpace, we share these records with thousands of others, or allow them to be indexed to create
powerful mosaics of personal data.”).
75
See generally, Roy Baumeister & Mark Leary, The Need to Belong - Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a
Fundamental Human-Motivation., 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (May 1995) 497, 499-508.
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behaviors that seek out stimuli of social value76 and encourage social interactions.77 Collectively,
social rewards activate three areas of the brain: the ventral tegmental (“VTA”), the prefrontal
cortex, and the ventral striatum.78 Collectively referred to as the mesolimbic pathway, 79 the VTA
projects neurotransmitters of dopamine to the nucleus accumbens (“NAcc”), located in the ventral
striatum, each time a response to a stimulus results in a reward. 80 Over time, through a process
called long-term potentiation, repeated reward responses create stronger associations and increase
the intensity of responses.81 The context and cadence in which dopamine is released and received
has important implications because the brain automatically associates the preceding behavior with
this reward.82 Eventually, the simple anticipation of a reward in connection with that behavior will
release dopamine83 and doing so intermittently can turn the dopamine-triggering behavior into a
habit.84
The human brain is malleable and not as steadfastly hard-wired as scientists once thought.85

76

Cameron Anderson et al., Is the Desire for Status a Fundamental Human Motive? A Review of the Empirical
Literature., 141 PSYCH. BULL. 574, 579 (2015).
77
Rebecca Von Der Heide et al., The Social Network-Network: Size is Predicted by Brain Structure and Function in
the Amygdala and Paralimbic Regions, 9 SOC. COGN. AFFECT. NEUROSCI. 1962, 1963 (2014).
78
See, e.g., Sylvia Morelli et al., The Neural Bases of Feeling Understood and Not Understood, 9 SOC. COGN. AFFECT.
NEUROSCI. 1890 (2014); Vasily Klucharev et al., Reinforcement Learning Signal Predicts Social Conformity, 61
NEURON. 140 (2009); Mitja Back et al., Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization, 21
PSYCHOL. SCI. 372, 372–74 (2010) (finding participants were expressing and communicating real personality rather
than promoting idealized versions of themselves).
79
Sören Krach et al., The Rewarding Nature of Social Interactions, 4 FRONT BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 1 (May 28, 2010).
80
Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About the Self is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 PROC.
NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 8038 (2012) (explaining participants underwent fMRI scanning and a significantly greater
response was observed in the NAcc bilaterally when disclosing one’s own opinions and attitudes than when judging
those of another and both the NAcc bilaterally and the VTA responded more strongly when disclosing beliefs about
one’s own personality traits than when judging others).
81
Joe L. Martinez & Brian E. Derrick, Long-Term Potentiation and Learning, 47 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 173 (1996).
82
Matthias Gruber et al., States of Curiosity Modulate Hippocampus-Dependent Learning via the Dopaminergic
Circuit, 84 NEURON. 486 (2014).
83
Wolfram Schultz, Dopamine Reward Prediction Error Coding, 18 DIALOGUES CLIN. NEUROSCI. 23 (2016).
84
Kelly McSweeney, This is Your Brain on Instagram: Effects of Social Media on the Brain, NOW (Mar. 17, 2019),
https://now.northropgrumman.com/this-is-your-brain-on-instagram-effects-of-social-media-on-the-brain/.
85
Julie Hamaide et al., Neuroplasticity and MRI: A Perfect Match, 131 NEUROIMAGE 13 (2016); See generally
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Accordingly, the increasing individual use of and time spent on SNSs, with their unprecedent
unlimited supply of social stimuli and rewards, 86 has caused individual and public identities to
converge.87 Although individuals, in general, feel freer to self-audit their presentation and
interactions88 on SNSs, such control empowers89 the individual’s converged conception of
themselves. Thus, a SNSs profile is more than just a virtual representation. 90
Individuals intuit the type of content that will conform best to the attitudes of their social

Christian Montag & Sarah Diefenbach, Towards Homo Digitalis: Important Research Issues for Psychology and the
Neurosciences at the Dawn of the Internet of Things and the Digital Society, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 415 (2018).
86
See, e.g., Christian Ruff & Ernst Fehr, The Neurobiology of Rewards and Values in Social Decision Making, 15
NATURE REV. 549 (2014); Sylvia Morelli et al., The Neural Bases of Feeling Understood and Not Understood, 9
SOC. COGN. AFFECT. NEUROSCI. 1890 (2014); Vasily Klucharev et al., Reinforcement Learning Signal Predicts
Social Conformity, 61 NEURON. 140 (2009); Daniel K. Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., How the Opinion of Others
Affects Our Valuation of Objects, 20 CURR. BIOL. 1165 (2010); Christopher Davey et al., Being Liked Activates
Primary Reward and Midline Self-Related Brain Regions, 31 HUM. BRAIN MAPP. 660 (2010); Keise Izuma et al.,
Processing of Social and Monetary Rewards in the Human Striatum, 58 NEURON. 284 (2008); Christoph Korn et al.,
Performance Feedback Processing Is Positively Biased as Predicted by Attribution Theory, 11 PLOS ONE (2016).
87
Karolina Sylwester & Matthew Purver, Twitter Language Use Reflects Psychological Differences between
Democrats and Republicans, 10 PLOS ONE (2015) (discovering that the psychological disparities among people
with differing political orientations through individual word use on Twitter was resonant with previous research;
liberals tend to place more emphasis on uniqueness and use more swear words, anxiety- and feeling-related words
while conservatives value group association and their tweets contain more achievement and religion-related words);
Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life,
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION SERIES ON DIGITAL LEARNING –YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA VOLUME 15 119,
129 (2008) (“Because of the intricate connection between offline and online social worlds, the audience that teens
envision online is connected to their social world offline, or to their hopes about the possible alternatives online.”);
Dar Meshi et al., The Emerging Neuroscience of Social Media, 19 TRENDS IN COGN. SCI. 771 (2015) (“While the
neural systems supporting these social cognitive processes have been studied extensively in the offline world, the
online social media is comparatively new. However, experts continue to conclude that the digital world often mimics
the offline social world and interactions within this online social network parallel offline social interactions.”). See
generally CHRISTINE HINE, VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2000); Malene Charlottte Larsen, Perspectives on Online
Social Networking, 35 SOC. COMP. MAG. (2007).
88
See, e.g., Liad Bareket-Bojmel et al., Strategic Self-Presentation on Facebook: Personal Motives and Audience
Response to Online Behavior, 55 COMPUT. IN HUM. BEHAV. 788 (2016); Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, Privacy, Emotional
Closeness, and Openness in Cyberspace, 19 COMPUT. IN HUM. BEHAV. 451 (2003).
89
Katelyn McKenna & John Bargh, Plan 9 From Cyberspace: The Implications of the Internet for Personality and
Social Psychology, 4 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 57 (2000).
90
See Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUM. RES. 139, 139 (1988); Russell Belk, Digital
Consumption and the Extended Self, 30 J. OF MKTG. MGMT. 1101 (2014).
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circle,91 which reinforces pre-conceived notions.92 Features of SNSs, such as automatically
personalized information feeds, encourage engagement, but also facilitate an individual’s descent
into a digital ideological echo chamber,93 otherwise known as a “filter bubble.” 94 By catering to
common cognitive biases95 and creatively manipulating the code of SNSs news feeds, bots and
other bad actors are impressively successful at normalizing their inflammatory ideas.96 In a world
that increasingly relies on SNSs as a primary source of information,97 the absence of traditional
media gatekeepers98 allows for unfettered digital deceptions.99
B. The Platform
SNSs are ultimately businesses that succeed only through expanding audiences and their

91

Hossein Derakhshan, The Web We Have to Save, MEDIUM (Jul. 14, 2015), https://medium.com/matter/the-web-wehave-to-save-2eb1fe15a426 (referring to this as the “tyranny of the novel and the popular”).
92
M. Mitchell Waldrop, News Feature: The Genuine Problem of Fake News, 114 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A.
12631 (2017) (“People prefer to consume news or entertainment that reinforces what they already believe. And that,
in turn, is rooted in well-understood psychological phenomena such as confirmation bias—our tendency to see only
the evidence that confirms our existing opinions and to ignore or forget anything that doesn’t fit.”).
93
Waldrop, supra note 120 (“[A] Facebook or Twitter newsfeed is just confirmation bias backed with computer power:
What you see when you look at the top of the feed is determined algorithmically by what you and your friends like .
. . discordant information gets pushed further and further down the queue, creating an insidious echo chamber.").
94
ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND HOW
WE THINK (2011).
95
See Baum et al., supra note 22; see also Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359
SCI. 1146, 1149 (2018) (finding “[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the
truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false
news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information”).
96
See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32
POL. BEHAV. 303 (2010); Donal Flynn et al., The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and
Unsupported Beliefs About Politics, ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCH. (2017); Jacob Ratkiewicz et al., Ass'n for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media, FIFTH INT'L AAAI
CONF. ON WEBLOGS AND SOC. MEDIA (2011) (“Bots are designed to amplify the reach of fake news and exploit the
vulnerabilities that stem from our cognitive and social biases. For example, they create the appearance of popular
grassroots campaigns to manipulate attention and target influential users to induce them to reshare misinformation.”).
97
Mark
Cohen,
Law
In
The
Age
Of
Social
Media,
FORBES
(Nov.
27,
2016),
www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2016/11/27/law-in-the-age-of-social-media/#42023fd31db8; see also Hunt
Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2017)
(reporting referral data shows “fake news” stories relied heavily on social media for traffic during the election).
98
Citron & Chesney, supra note 41.
99
DAVID PATRIKARAKOS, WAR IN 140 CHARACTERS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA IS RESHAPING CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2017).
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attention;100 they are not in the social media business, they are in the data trade industry.101 Thus,
their success in selling these enviable enormous concentrated hives of attention to advertisers102 is
determined by their ability to satisfy individuals’ primal social needs103 through social cognition,
self-referential cognition, and social reward processing.104 A.I. algorithms, simply understood as
self-learning codes fueled by user data, ensure and enforce these feedback loops.
Effectively grabbing the attention of users for advertisers, SNSs are required to
increasingly demanding detailed data and enhance engagement.105 Thus, it is unsurprising that the
more active an individual is on a SNS, the more they feel connected,106 fulfilled,107 and gratified,108

Tufekci, supra note 121 (“Facebook makes money, in other words, by profiling us and then selling our attention to
advertisers, political actors and others. These are Facebook’s true customers, whom it works hard to please.”)
101
DIG., CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., FINAL REPORT, 2017-19, HC 1630 (describing how Facebook traded
access to user data in exchange for advertising buys); Gabriel Dance et al., Facebook Offered Users Privacy Wall,
Then Let Tech Giants Around It, N. Y. TIMES, 1 (Dec. 19, 2018) (describing how personal data was traded among
150 companies without user consent).
102
Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). (“The digital revolution made a different kind of scarcity salient. It is not the
scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, scarcity of audience attention.”)
103
Natalya Bazarova & Yoon Hyung Choi, Self-Disclosure in Social Media: Extending the Functional Approach to
Disclosure Motivations and Characteristics on Social Network Sites, 64 J. COMMUN. 635 (2014).
104
Diana Tamir & Adrian Ward, Old Desires, New Media, in PSYCH. OF DESIRE 432; see also Matthew Pittman &
Brandon Reich, Social Media and Loneliness: Why an Instagram Picture May Be Worth More than a Thousand
Twitter Words, 62 COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 155 (2016) (“[T]he three primary psychological factors driving the
continued use of Twitter, Facebook and Snapchat are: [1] comparison with other people, [2] feelings of trust and
bonding, and [3] finding groups with attitudes and interests aligned with one’s own.”).
105
Tufekci, supra note 121.
106
Nicole Ellison et al., The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online
Social Network Sites, 12 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 1143 (2007); Charles Steinfield et al., Social Capital, SelfEsteem, and Use of Online Social Network Sites: A Longitudinal Analysis, 29 J. APP. DEV. PSYCH. 434 (2008);
Sebastián Valenzuela et al., Is There Social Capital in a Social Network Site?: Facebook Use and College Students’
Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation1, 14 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 875 (2009); Gina Masullo Chen, Tweet
this: A Uses and Gratifications Perspective on How Active Twitter Use Gratifies a Need to Connect with Others, 27
COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV, 755 (2011).
107
Aqdas Malik & Marko Nieminen, Uses and Gratifications of Digital Photo Sharing on Facebook, 33 TELEMATICS
AND INFORMATICS (2015) (finding that when SNSs users sbared personal photos on SNSs, they felt 'fulfilled' from
the attention and affection).
108
Chei Sian Lee & Long Ma, News Sharing in Social Media: The Effect of Gratifications and Prior Experience, 28
COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 331 (2012).
100
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and the more likely they are to repeatedly engage with the platform.109 For example, upon
registering for a Facebook account, the notification center includes activities from an initial set of
connections, which establishes the link to social reward.110 The more a user uses the SNS, the more
active the notification center becomes, establishing the expectation that anytime the user opens the
application, they can reasonably expect to be rewarded.111 Another example is the notification
algorithm from the Facebook-owned company, Instagram. The algorithm is programmed to
withhold “likes” on photos and to deliver them in larger clusters at once. This intentional cadence
is meant to take advantage of psychological anticipatory rewarding while simultaneously
encouraging habitual use through balancing negative and positive feedback signals.112
In the early days of SNSs, platforms were populated by content only from users’ immediate
friends and family as the algorithms were based on engagements statistics alone113 and required
structured data, meaning human manpower was required to interpret the data.114 The more data
that is collected, the smarter, faster and more accurate the algorithms become.115 SNSs were quick

109

Mike Allen, Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook, AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), www.axios.com/sean-parker-unloadson-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-1513306792-f855e7b4-4e99-4d60-8d512775559c2671.html (According to the founder of Facebook last year: “The thought process that went into
building these applications, Facebook being the first of them, was all about: 'How do we consume as much of
your time and conscious attention as possible?' … And that means that we need to sort of give you a little
dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And
that's going to get you to contribute more content, and that's going to get you… more likes and comments…. It's
a social-validation feedback loop… exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with,
because you're exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology.”)
110
Tracii Ryan et al., The Uses and Abuses of Facebook, 3 J. BEHAV. ADDICT. 133 (2014).
111
Id.
112
60
Minutes:
What
is
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Hacking”?,
CBS
NEWS
(Apr.
9,
2017),
www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/tH3KnkheO5s1zWLe3kApXT_iDti_xiVC/brain-hacking/.
113
WAEL GHONIM & JAKE RASHBASS, TRANSPARENCY: WHAT’S GONE WRONG WITH SOCIAL MEDIA AND WHAT CAN
WE DO ABOUT IT?, SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POLITICS, & PUB. POL'Y
(Mar. 3, 2018),
www.shorensteincenter.org/transparency-social-media-wael-ghonim/.
114
IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING (2016).
115
Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH.
106 (2019).
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to discover that knowledge of people’s personalities could be used to manipulate and influence
them,116 and began to alter their algorithms, which are today notoriously elusive, to achieve those
results.117
Today, the engines of SNSs are advanced A.I. algorithms called “neural networks,” which
replicate the structure of neurons in the human brain.118 Neural networks are arranged such that
humans do not perceive their actual operation and do not get to fix the manner in which elements
are weighed.119 These unperceivable networks are capable of “deep learning,” meaning they train
themselves120 by using probability theory to navigate uncertain and ambiguous data121 and,
thereby, increase their accuracy.122 Similar to earlier algorithms, with more experience they gain,
the ‘smarter’ they become.123 Today, these advanced algorithms are so sophisticated they
outperform human judgment.124
A.I. has exponentially widened the spigot by which SNSs continue to amass massive

Jacob Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to Recipients’ Personality Traits, 23
PSYCHOL. SCI. 578 (2012).
117
Nausicaa Renner, Memes Trump Articles on Breitbart’s Facebook Page, COLUM. J. REV. (Jan. 30, 2017),
www.cjr.org/tow_center/memes-trump-articles-on-breitbarts-facebook-page.php.
118
Jay Stanley, The Dawn of Robot Surveillance, AM. CIV. L. UNION (Jun. 17, 2019), www.aclu.org/report/dawnrobot-surveillance (noting researchers believe that by mimicking the underlying structure of the brain they will be
better able to mimic the intelligent tasks performed).
119
Quoc V. Le et al., Building High-Level Features Using Large Scale Unsupervised Learning, ARXIV (Jul. 12, 2012).
120
From Not Working to Neural Networking-Technology, ECONOMIST (Jun. 23, 2016).
121
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 114.
122
Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), www.news.mit.edu/2017/explainedneural-networks-deep-learning-0414.
123
Natalie Wolchover, New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Neural Networks, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2017),
www.wired.com/story/new-theory-deep-learning/.
124
Youyou et al., supra note 78 (finding computer-based models significantly more accurate than humans in a core
social-cognitive task: personality judgment).
116
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reserves of rich personal data,125 doing so at the cost of users’ personal privacy.126 Further, as the
symbiotic relationship between the data-dependent SNSs A.I. algorithms and the implicitly
compliant users deepens with increased engagement,127 new forms of digital deception, such as
“deep fakes,” are developed and deployed.128
II. THE PARADOX OF PRIVACY
With data as the new oil129 and SNSs priming the pump courtesy of neuroscience,130 the
resulting commodification of users131calls into question individual’s right to privacy. The largely
unregulated SNSs have been permitted to violate and dictate new social norms as the audience of
their oversight expands.132 For example, more than one-fourth of the world’s data is currently

125

In 2016, YouTube announced the largest existence of a single dataset to date, consisting of content amassed from
six million individual users content, organized and arranged into 4,800 categories. See, e.g., Sudheendra
Vijayanarasimhan & Paul Natsev, Announcing YouTube-8M: A Large and Diverse Labeled Video Dataset for Video
Understanding Research, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), http://ai.googleblog.com/2016/09/announcingyoutube-8m-large-and-diverse.html; Sami Abu-El-Haija et al., YouTube-8M: A Large-Scale Video Classification
Benchmark (Note: the initial announcement was subsequently reduced to 6 million).
126
See generally, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
(2013); Jacob Kastrenakes, Google’s Chief Internet Evangelist Says, “Privacy May Actually Be an Anomaly,” THE
VERGE (Nov. 10, 2013), www.theverge.com/2013/11/20/5125922/vint-cerf-google-internet-evangelist-saysprivacy-may-be-anomaly.
127
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, Privacy 2.0, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT, 220 (2008) (“The more
our identity is associated with our daily actions, the greater opportunities others will have to offer judgments about
those actions.”).
128
“Deep fakes" come from a specific type of "deep learning" in which pairs of algorithms are pitted against each
other in “generative adversarial networks,” or GANS. See generally, Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes
and the New Disinformation War, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 30, 2019.
129
Data is the New Oil, ANA (Nov. 3, 2006), www.ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html (credited
with the phrase “data is the new oil”); Fuel of the Future, 423 THE ECONOMIST, 14 (May 6, 2017) ("data has replaced
oil as the world’s most valuable resource"); Charlie Warzel, Trump Is Tracking Your Phone, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/opinion/trump-privacy-2020.html (“We live in a world that’s driven by data.
It’s often called “the new oil.”); Vanian, supra note 57 (“Big Data is the new oil.”).
130
See infra Part I.
131
See, e.g. Richard Jenkings, How Much is Your Email Address Worth?, THE DRUM (Apr. 9, 2012),
www.thedrum.com/opinion/2012/04/04/how-much-your-email-address-worth (reporting a market rate of $89 per email address); Lauren Feiner, Reddit Users Are the Least Valuable of Any Social Network, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2019),
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/11/reddit-users-are-the-least-valuable-of-any-social-network.html (valuing Reddit users at
$0.30); Jay R. Corrigan et al., How Much is Social Media Worth? Estimating the Value of Facebook by Paying Users
to Stop Using It, 13 PLOS ONE (2018) (calculating a $1,000 per North American Facebook user).
132
Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters,’ ProPublica (Sept. 14, 2017),

Realistically Revaluating Social Media Data Protections

18

governed by Facebook’s Terms of Service.133 SNSs’ access to and oversight of such an
unprecedented breadth and depth of individuals134 has permitted the reshaping of traditional norms
to better align with platform’s profits.135 This acquiescence ultimately stems from the United
States’ detrimental decision during the Internet’s inception to prioritize accessibility of the internet
over personal privacy concerns.136
Part II provides a contextual overview of the legal right to personal privacy in the United
States by looking at both its’ historical development and modern materialization. In understanding
the foundation upon which the concept of privacy devoleped and the landscape in which its’
protections currently exist, the necessisty to revaluate and redefine personal privacy becomes clear.
In order to maintain economic superiority on the world stage, the United States must modernize
personal digital safeguards akin to the rest of the Western world.137 Section A traces the historical
inceotion and development of the concept of personal privacy relative to technological
developments. Section B takes a look at three of the most relevant regulatory institutions in regard

www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters (reporting Facebook allowed
placement of ads targeting and excluding African Americans, mothers, disabled people, Jews, and other minorities).
133
Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet, VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016),
www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history-youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-freespeech.
134
See, e.g. Milton Mueller, Hyper-Transparency and Social Control: Social Media as Magnets for Regulation, 39
TELECOMM. POL'Y 804 (2015); Jack Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
(2017) 1217, 1223 (“[T]he problem is not the robots; it is the humans.”).
135
Clive Thompson, I’m So Totally, Digitally Close to You, N. Y. TIMES, at MM42 (Sept. 5, 2008) (quoting Mark
Zuckerberg: "Facebook has always tried to push the envelope. And at times that means stretching people and getting
them to be comfortable with things they aren’t yet comfortable with. A lot of this is just social norms catching up
with what technology is capable of. In essence, Facebook users didn’t think they wanted constant, up-to-the-minute
updates on what other people are doing. Yet when they experienced this sort of omnipresent knowledge, they found
it intriguing and addictive. Why? Social scientists have a name for this sort of incessant online contact.”).
136
See infra Part II.B.1.
137
See, e.g., Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects Your Online Data Differently Than the U.S., N. Y.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/29/technology/data-privacy-policy-us-europe.html;
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Facebook, Google and Twitter Accept to Change Their Terms of Services to Make
Them Customer-Friendly and Compliant with EU Rules (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=614254.
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to personal data privacy and assesses their relative current responses.
A. The Concept
Anonymity is foundational to the fabric of America,138 the protection of which has
immense individual and societal value by way of self-determination and democratic
deliberation.139 In an age when individual identity is automatically aligned with digital data,
evaporating any autonomy one may have,140 personal privacy has no definitive legal protection141
or privilege.142
Personal privacy, like freedom, has always been difficult to define, yet definitive once

See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 368 & n.3 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is little
doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing. The essays in the Federalist Papers, published under
the pseudonym of 'Publius,' are only the most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political writing that
occurred during the ratification of the Constitution.”); id. at 361 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he historical evidence
indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on
the ground that forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press.”').
139
Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2087 (2004) ("[P]rivacy is
necessary for both “individual self-determination” and “de- mocratic deliberation.' Based in part on civic
republicanism, this conception views democracy as dependent on common participatory activities, reciprocal respect,
and the need for consensus about political, , , ").
140
See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, at MM30 (July 25, 2010) (“All around
the world, political leaders, scholars and citizens are searching for responses to the challenge of preserving control of
our identities in a digital world that never forgets. Are the most promising solutions going to be technological?
Legislative? Judicial? Ethical? A result of shifting social norms and cultural expectations? Or some mix of the
above?"); Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, Answering Privacy Concerns with New Settings, WASH. POST, at A19
(May 24, 2010) (“We have heard the feedback. There needs to be a simpler way to control your information. In the
coming weeks, we will add privacy controls that are much simpler to use. We will also give you an easy way to turn
off all third-party services.”); Cecilia Kang, Senate Online Privacy Hearing to Draw FTC, FCC Chairs, Google, Apple
and Facebook, WASH. POST: VOICES (July 23, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/
the_senate_commerce_committees.html (“Analysts said greater focus from Congress on online privacy has led Web
sites and online ad networks to move toward self-regulation to fend off legislation. This self-regulation is aimed at
greater disclosure on Web sites that consumers are being tracked, and an easy mechanism for opting out.”).
141
Susan Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
(2003) 123, 191-92 (“The First Amendment protects the privacy of the identity and associates of an individual; the
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the activities of an individual; and the Fifth Amendment protects the
privacy of the thoughts of an individual.”)
142
Id. at 137 ("By the time the Twenty-First Century dawned . . . [t]he rise and proliferation of cybercrime raised new
problems[], both with the enforcement of existing substantive laws against conduct vectored through cyberspace and
also in the gathering of evidence without violating the existing privacy standards.”).
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removed.143 A legal right to privacy in the United States was initially tied to physical property and
one’s physical person.144 In 1890, in response to technological uses and abuses of that time,145
(specifically “Kodakers lying in wait”146) Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren conceived of a
flexible,147 yet protective, idea of an individual legal right to privacy.148 Seventy years later,
William Prosser defined and codified four tort causes of action149 surrounding such a right.150 The
Supreme Court has noted that Prossor’s codification of the privacy torts was evidence of a “strong
tide” in the states valuing personal privacy.151
Today, Prosser’s four definitive causes of action, derived from an initially fluid concept
and developed at a time when privacy was defined in tandem with physical property, have proven
ineffective and insufficient to the intangible digital violations of SNSs.152 Scholarly critics claim
that, although Prosser’s privacy parameters were necessarily enumerated, legal institutions have

143

See Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and Security of Personal Information: Economic incentives and Technological
Solutions, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, 179 (2004); see generally DANIEL SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY ix (“There is no overarching conception of privacy-it must be mapped like terrain, by
painstakingly studying the landscape . . . . Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other
things) freedom of thought, control over one's body, solitude in one's home, control over personal information,
freedom from surveillance, protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”)
144
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects...”).
145
See, e.g., Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
146
Denis O’Brien, Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 440 (1902).
147
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 145, at 293 (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”).
148
Id. at 198–200.
149
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of
invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff . . . intrusion into seclusion, disclosure of private facts, false light
publicity, and appropriation of likeness.”).
150
See id. at 423 (1960) (“[I]t is high time that we realize what we are doing, and give some consideration to the
question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt [in expanding the domain of privacy law].”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
151
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487–88 (1975).
152
See, e.g., Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889
(2010); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983) (stating the privacy torts have “failed to become a useable and effective means of
redress for plaintiffs”); Neil Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 359–60
(2011) (“For better or for worse, American law currently uses tools developed in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth
centuries to deal with these problems of the twenty-first.”).
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misunderstood their purpose, pigeonholed by precedent.153 Trying to retrofit traditional notions of
privacy protections that emphasize public exposure is misplaced for modern digital dilemmas.154
For example, under current legal standards, liability for data breaches lies solely with the
individual who placed the data, penalizing them for their choice in place rather than the individual
who breached it.155 As a scholar once summarized, “Horse law and haystack law are uneasily
tolerated in the complex business of mass production and national distribution.”156
‘Privacy’ originated as and has been redefined since as a reactionary concept.157
Accordingly, throughout American history its’ parameters and protections have shifted in response
to economic and societal developments. For instance, the caller identification on home telephones
was once shunned as violations of privacy but are now used routinely to enhance personal

153

See Lior Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2034 (2010): "[T]here have been many
opportunities presented for judges to address [data privacy] problems via tort rules… [I]n the majority of cases, the
courts have understood themselves to be junior partners to legislators and regulators in dealing with new privacy
challenges. The possibility that legislators might want to legislate has convinced the courts to stop innovating through
common law. And the unwillingness of judges to modernize tort protections to deal with new challenges has
prompted legislators in turn to legislate in ad hoc, often incoherent ways.”).
154
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 481 n.18 (2006) (highlighting the ways that the
legal system may fall short when it comes to protecting privacy rights in general); Joel Reidenberg, Privacy in the
Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L. J. 195, 208 (1992) (“The
American legal system does not contain a comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively address
the acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business community.”);
Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however,
no successful standards, legal or otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data in
cyberspace.”); Randall Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 1133 (1992) (arguing society must adapt the legal concept of privacy and “embed[] [it] in a context different
than external and social norms, one allowing its contours to fit the [contemporary] social and economic conditions,”
and advancing a privacy model rooted in “the individual’s control of information” and “on an enforceable obligation
of confidentiality for those possessing private information”).
155
See generally Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for
Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J. F. 614 (2018).
156
Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV.
465, 466 (1987).
157
Sarah Igo, Private Lives? Leave Me Out, History Today (Jun. 28, 2018), www.historytoday.com/historymatters/private-lives-leave-me-out (“As in the past, we do not stop to consider what privacy consists of until it seems
– just like that – to fall victim to unimagined breaches. And, as in the 19th century, when wiretapping and candid
photography were new, today’s technologies of data-harvesting and scraping are already transforming our beliefs
about the borders of our private selves.”).
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privacy.158 Although America has redefined privacy protections to meet the needs of individual
issues of the times, the aims of individual determinism and democratic deliberation have always
been at the core of its’ meaning.159
The paramaters of a modern definition of personal privacy should, at a minimum,
encompass an individual’s right to control their identity which is now inextricably tied to their
digital data.160 Personal control over one’s identity is fundamental to individual liberty in
America.161 It is only once an individual is empowered to take responsibility of their self can one
engage in democratic deliberation through consent.162 Justice Story conceptualized of consent as
“an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance the good or

158

See generally, Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 65.
See, e.g. Lee Bygrave & Kamiel Koelman, Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their Interaction in the
Context of Electronic Copyright Management Systems, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT 59, 64-65 (2000); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1049 (2000).
160
See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 7 (1968) (Writing that “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989) (noting that "the right to privacy
exists because democracy must impose limits on the extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the
day-to-day conduct of individual lives”); See generally Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data:
Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (2013) (arguing control of data must ultimately rest with the
individual).
161
Mark Andrus, The New Oil: The Right to Control One’s Identity in Light of the Commoditization of the Individual,
AM. BAR ASS'N (September 28, 2017) www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/
09/06_andrus/.
162
A number of privacy law scholars have documented how the imoprtance of consent is currently impractically
conditioned as an all-or-nothing proposition for users. See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies
of Digital Consent, WASH. U. L. REV. (2019) ("Consent transforms the moral landscape . . . It reinforces fundamental
cultural notions of autonomy and choice."); Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and Moral
Core of Digital Consent, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 1804 (2019); Meg Leta Jones, The Development of Consent to
Computing, IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING 1 (2019); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013); MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 529 (2007); Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).
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evil on each side.”163 Thus, consent naturally portends with control over one’s identity and is
necessarily integral to a modern reconception of the reactionary concept of ‘privacy’. Tellingly, in
a recent Congressional inquiry regarding abuse and misuse of personal data, the chief executive
officer of Facebook, Mark Zuckerburg, looking to escape the potential of federal regulatory
oversight, went out of his way to say more than one thousand times over the course of the hearing
that he is working to ensure “Facebook puts users in ‘control’.”164
B. The Institutions
The amorphous nature of American personal privacy in the digital age has translated into
a patchwork of ‘protections’165 that are often in conflict with other regulations and remedies166 and
permits ample abuse. For example, in the first six months of 2019, there have been 3,800 publicly
disclosed breaches of personal data, totaling an astonishing 4.1 billion individual records.167
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1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 222 (1835).
Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg) www.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Testimony-Zuckerberg-FC-Hrg-on-FacebookTransparency
-and-Use-of-ConsumerData-2018-04-11.pdf; see also, Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social
Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-forsocial-networking/10156700570096634/ (“This privacy-focused platform will be built around several principles:
People should have simple, intimate places where they have clear control over who can communicate with them and
confidence that no one else can access what they share.”); Dan Fletcher, Facebook Mania: Privacy Changes for
Nearly 500 Million, TIME (May 20, 2010), www.content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798-4,00.html
(“The way that people think about privacy is changing a bit. . .What people want isn’t complete privacy. It isn’t that
they want secrecy. It’s that they want control over what they share and what they don’t."); Anita Balakrishnan et al.,
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s statements on privacy, 2003-2018, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018),
www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergs-statements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html ("When I built
the first version of Facebook, almost nobody I knew wanted a public page on the internet. That seemed scary. But as
long as they could make their page private, they felt safe sharing with their friends online. Control was key.”).
165
Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy and Terms of Use., in SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW 50 (2d ed. 2017).
166
See, e.g., David Ruiz, US Congress Proposes Comprehensive Federal Data Privacy Legislation—Finally,
Malwarebytes
Labs
(Mar.
7,
2019),
www.blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/privacy-securityworld/2019/03/what-congress-means-when-it-talks-about-data-privacy-legislation (“Businesses are expected to
comply with data privacy laws based on the data’s type. Law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community,
on the other hand, are expected to comply with a different framework that sometimes separates data based on
“content” and “non-content.”)
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RISK BASED SECURITY, 2019 MIDYEAR QUICKVIEW DATA BREACH REPORT (Nov. 2019),
https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/2019-midyear-data-breach-quickview-report.
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Conversely, less than 1% of cybersecurity breaches were successfully enforced last year due the
inability to identify the hacker source.168
The current paradoxical dichotomy of providing privacy for digital abusers, but not
innocent users,169 stems from the United States’ inception of the Internet when the government
affirmatively chose not to implement digital security measures.170 Instead, government institutions
have been left to their respective devices171 to retrofit legal standards172 that are often inadequate
deterrents for modern digital deceptions.173 In considering effectuating a meaningful privacy
paradigm shift, each branch of government offers particular compententcies in effectuating
such,174 and there is much scholarly debate as to the realitive efficacy of each.175
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Mieke Eoyang et al., To Catch a Hacker: Toward a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, and Punish
Malicious Cyber Actors (Cyber Enforcement Initiative., Third Way), Oct. 29, 2018.
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See Laurie Baughman, Friend Request or Foe?, 19 WIDENER L.J. 933, 944 (2010) (“[SNS] run on the honor system.
The sites do not check into whether a user who creates a profile is in fact a real person, so the creation of a fake
profile is as easy as the creation of a real profile. A fake profile may allow an abuser to access the site of a victim or
victim's family member, when an authentic profile would act as a red flag.”) (footnotes omitted).
170
See Greg Allen & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT'L AFF.
(Jul. 2017).
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Debra Cassens Weiss, Does Fourth Amendment Protect Computer Data? Scalia Says It’s a Really Good Question,
AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar. 24, 2014) www.abajournal.com/news/article/asked_about_nsa_stuff_scalia_says_conversations_arent_protected_by_fourth_a.
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Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209 (2018) (“The digital data at issue—personal location information
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents . . . .”)
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ANDREA WECKERLE, CIVILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 251 (2013) ("Privacy laws, such as the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, are considered woefully antiquated. For example, email older than 180 days receives
no privacy protection, and, under current law, it is possible to access these materials without a judge’s permission
and simply with an administrative subpoena, which many privacy experts find disturbing.”)
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For an in-depth discussion on each branch’s strengths and weakness, see Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial
Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 354 (2016).
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Connie Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get Over It!,” 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 179–81 (2011) (arguing
courts should extend the common law privacy causes of action to cover disclosure and commercialization of personal
information); Jonathan Frieden et al., Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcement to
Improve Internet Privacy, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1722–25 (2011) (stating courts should resolve privacy
controversies and Congress should propose new legislation that establishes additional privacy causes of action);
FREDERICK LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 258 (2011)
(disagreeing with a focus on court action and, instead, stressing the need for a new federal administrative agency
with a broad mandate to define and prosecute privacy infringements); Catherine Schmierer, Better Late than Never:
How the Online Advertising Industry’s Response to Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for
Regulation, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 56–57 (advocating industry self-regulation is preferable anytime rapidly
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1. The FTC
The United States has always prioritized the collective public good stemming from the free
flow of information over individual privacy.176 In the 1970s, the United States, along with the
United Kingdom, created a framework of “fair information practice principles” (“FIPPs”)177 which
encapsulated and promoted this priority of the collective good. Created as a model for Western
nations to adopt and guide their respective data protection laws, FIPPs centered on four core
principles: “(1) defined obligations that limited the use of personal data; (2) transparent processing
systems; (3) limited procedural and substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.”178 Accordingly,
in the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), encouraged
American businesses to adopt and publish online privacy policies in line with these FIPPs.179 The
United States even embodied the FIPPs in other statutory regulations outside the digital realm.180
As the FIPPs were incorporated around the world alongside the spread of the Internet, the
FTC abruptly diverted away from the core principles. In 1998, the FTC revised their focal priorities
and declared the primacy of “notice,” or procedural rquirements, as the “most fundamental
principle,” thereby abandoning the core commitments to substantive personal data protections.181
The impact of the United States’ ideological departure from the FIPPs has reverberated into deep

developing technology is involved); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2009) (suggesting a system where people tag their data with labels indicating permissible
uses).
176
Westin, supra note 188; Margaret O’Mara, The End of Privacy Began in the 1960s, N. Y. TIMES, at A31 (Dec. 6,
2018).
177
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., GUIDELINES ON PROTECT. OF PRIV'Y & TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERS. DATA
(1981).
178
Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1614.
179
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998).
180
See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2018) (consumer financial information); 45 C.F.R.
§§160, 162, 164 (patient health data privacy).
181
Privacy Online, supra note 179.
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divides to this day.182 For example, the European Union has insisted on the development and use
of “safe harbor” procedures,183 which have heightened levels of privacy protection, in all data
commerce with the United States today.184
The only American federal body authorized to oversee and administer personal data
privacy regulations today is the FTC. 185 In line with the revised, FIPPs-free focus, and aside from
a limited set of special circumstances,186 the agency’s jurisdiction is predicated on affirmative
commercial misrepresentative practices,187 such as explicitly deceptive spam e-mails, misleading
instructions, and fake advertisements.188 Under these FTC guidelines, SNSs’ neuroscientific
driven data collection practices have, thusfar, been shielded,189 as long as somewhere on their

See generally Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 92 (2001); see also, e.g., O’Mara, supra note 197 (“This was a contrast to Western
Europe, where privacy was something to be carefully protected, and therefore treated with a far more robust
regulatory approach. In being so relentlessly focused on government’s use and abuse of data, Congress paid little
attention to what private industry was doing. American companies remained free to gather data on people who use
their products.”).
183
EU-U.S. & Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield.
184
For more on this fracture and Europe’s relative success in continuing to follow the FIPPs, see, e.g., Paul Schwartz,
European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995); David
Scheer, Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy Cop to World, WALL ST. J., at A1 (Oct. 10, 2003); Adam
Satariano, New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading Tech Watchdog, N. Y. TIMES, at A1 (May 25, 2018).
185
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq. (2018) (empowering the agency broadly to enforce unfair or deceptive consumer
data practices and to enforce federal privacy and data regulations).
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Specific limited jurisdictional authority was extended to the FTC in order to police privacy practices by the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2018); see also FED. TRADE
COMM'N, CHILDREN’S PRIVACY (2018) www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/children
%27s-privacy.
187
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM, 5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-Making (Jul. 24, 2019),
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breakinghistory;
Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1041 (1984); PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE § 5.04[2]
(2002).
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See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-datasecurity-update-2018.
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In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., MDL No. 2843 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 9, 2019) (faulting
Facebook for treating privacy as an “all-or-nothing” proposition, “sharing information with your social media friends
does not categorically eliminate your privacy interest in that information.”)
182

Realistically Revaluating Social Media Data Protections

27

platform some semblance of a privacy policy exists.190
2. Congress
Last year the Senate’s Commerce and Judiciary committees called Facebook Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) Mark Zuckerberg to testify to explain Facebook’s privacy policies in
light of the mass Russian meddling on his network.191 Senator Orrin Hatch began by earnestly
asking Mr. Zuckerberg, “[So], how do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for
your service?”192 The CEO stifled a laugh, smirked, and replied, “Senator, we run ads.”193
Like the courts, legislative bodies have been slow to respond to rapid digital
advancements.194 While there have been numerous Congressional hearings on digital data privacy
this year,195 neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate have enacted any comprehensive
data protection legislation. Currently, Congress has set forth a sectorial statutory patchwork
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See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Mar. 2012); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously In
Privacy Law, 19 STAN. L. REV 431 (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media
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Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/.
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In 2016, the first Congressional hearing regarding A.I. was conducted, more than half a century after the military
and sciences began developing such technology, see The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence, Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science & Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2016).
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See, e.g., Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States, Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 116th Cong. 1 (2019); Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big Data,
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Cons. Protection & Commerce, 116th Cong. 1 (2019); Consumer Data Privacy:
Examining Lessons from the European Union’s Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy
Act, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2018); Examining Safeguards for
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addressing data privacy statutes,196 some of which include a private right of action.197 Following
September 11, 2001, personal privacy concerns198 have, again, taken a back seat to national
security.199 While state legislatures have taken to slowly passing statutory regulations addressing
personal data privacy,200 the effectiveness of their siloed protections is questionable in a boundaryless digital world.
New bipartisan calls for federal personal SNSs data protections following the 2016 election
have increased,201 even prompting SNSs to preemptively ask for them in hopes of staving off more
dense regulatory measures.202 Regardless, instead of taking a proactive prescriptive approach, the
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See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, H.R. 3103, 104th
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2710(C); Cable Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 5I(f); Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707.
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Trump Administration has double-downed on an institutional reactionary approach rather than
develop preventive practices.203 In 2017, President Trump signed a congressional resolution to
repeal protective measures enacted before his election that would have prevented internet service
providers from collecting, mining, and selling customer information without permission.204 In line
with President Trump’s change in course, his latest Attorney General, Robert Barr, demanded
SNSs, such as Facebook, develop technology that gives the government access to more of users’
private online communications otherwise he would ensure punitive legislative measures would be
“on the way.”205
3. The Judiciary
Absent explicit textual command, the courts have interpreted the United States Constitution
as protecting personal rights to decisional and informational privacy.206 Attempts to establish
whether such Constitutional protections extend to personal digital data have failed at their
inception given the standing requirement,207 which requires a particularized, concrete, and
imminent injury.208 The intangible nature of digital data deceptions has made it nearly impossible

Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT.
83 Fed. Reg. 48600, 48601 (Sept. 26, 2018) (“The Administration is instead proposing that discussion of
consumer privacy in the United States refocus on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating
what those practices should be.”)
204
Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Internet Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, at B3 (Apr. 4, 2017).
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William Barr. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of J., Keynote Address at Fordham University Int’l Conf. on Cyber
Sec. (July 23, 2019).
206
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV(containing the only explicit textual reference to information privacy); For
decisional privacy reflected in jurisprudence, see e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (identifying two
different privacy interests which may be constitutionally protected: the interest of controlling the disclosure of
personal matters and the interest in being able to make certain personal decisions free from government influence).
207
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2013) (stating that imminence requires the alleged injury be
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422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (“In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff
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for plaintiffs to successfully direct injury209 and subsequent, tangible harms.210 Conversely, in
personal data adjudications governed by specific statutory protections that provides for a private
cause of action, lower courts have generally conferred standing.211
The first Supreme Court case related to personal protections on the Internet was on First
Amendment grounds,212 leaving lower courts213 and scholars214 to speculate the significance of
prioritizing free speech over or even exclusive to a common law right to personal digital privacy.
Two decades later, Justice Kennedy stated that, “While in the past there may have been difficulty
in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the

209
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Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiffs plausibly alleged “substantial risk” of
identity theft in data breach case where “[n]o long sequence of uncertain contingencies involving multiple
independent actors has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any harm”).
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See, e.g., Birnbaum v. U.S., 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1978) (describing the distinction between common law and
constitutional privacy claims); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(Johnson, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy is a creature of state law and is not
constitutionally based); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 n. 5 (E. D. Pa. 1972)
(distinguishing right of privacy from constitutional cases); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (constitutional
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See e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000) (opining “the privacy torts may be of limited
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answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social
media in particular.”215 Again, the lower courts and scholars quickly interpreted this statement as
the Court’s signaling the preeminence of free speech on the Internet over all else.216
These, quick interpretations of the Supreme Court are fundamentally flawed and indicative
of the need for a uniform national law protecting personal digital privacy. The lower courts and
scholars’ logic mistakes content, which is digital speech, with individuals actions on SNSs, such
as posting, liking, and commenting, which is collected as digital data. In other words, content is
what users say, data is what they do. are indicative of the necessity for a uniform national law
protecting personal data privacy.
III. THE PROPERTIZATION OF PERSONAL SOCIAL MEDIA DATA
A complex issue requires an innovative, nuanced solution and sincethe New Deal, some
regulatory measures have been driven by shifting societal considerations, not constitutionally
constrainted.217 Given the integral role neuroscience plays in the symbiotic digital ecosystem
between the individual and SNSs, a modern solution must necessarily account for the science, as
well. Accordingly, casting personal digital data as personal property in American common law
most accurately reflects how both individuals already implicitly view their online and offline
actions as one in the same and SNSs’ commodification of individuals allows them to profit. Section
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A defines and details the idea of SNSs data as personal property. Section B explains the resulting
role SNSs would play in such a shift as information bailees.
A. The Idea
The economic outlook218 and scientific studies219 already consider personal digital data as
property. American legal institutions, on the other hand, have yet to align effectively with this
reality, as previously discussed. The importance of defining and demarcating digital data as
personal property allows for individuals, institutions, and SNSs, alike, to develop policies and
protocols reflective of fundamentally equitable values.220
The traditional definition of a ‘property’ right is an “interest. . . that is enforceable against
the world.”221 Reconceptualizing digital data as a personal right against the world, aligns with the
previously discussed modern reevaluation of privacy consisting of control and consent,222 best
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redefined relative to data-as-property as the individual’s ability and right to decide on and
demarcate boundaries (if any) around their property.223 A propertization of individuals personal
data would include the common law rights that run with property,224 including transferability and
alienability.225 Propertization of personal data also reaffirms the Framer’s fundamental aims of
democratic deliberation and indivual determinism by reallocating property to its’ rightful owner
as it empowers and encourages such exchanges. 226
America has a long history of defining and regulating privacy in tandem with property.227,
In fact, some courts have already indicated an inclination to apply property principles to digital
intangibles.228 While some scholars are sharply divided on the efficacy of treating digital data as
property believing it could lead to a slippery slope of black-market data tradingm229 other would
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like to take the idea to the other extreme, disregarding privacy concerns, altogether.230
B. The Information Bailees
Recasting the role of SNSs as information bailess best reflects the reality of the current
digital ecosystem. SNSs’ rely on and are driven by individuals engaging and thereby creating the
personal data which the platforms, in turn, commodify. In creating and harvesting this digital
dependence, SNSs should have, and arguably already do, the role and responsibilities of bailees.231
Revising the roles of SNSs as fiduciaries recalibrates the power dynamics of their
relationship with users. Today, SNSs implicitly encourage users to trust them with personal
information, so implementing a corresponding duty of confidentiality and care on SNSs is not such
a stretch. The current implicit contractual relationship between SNSs and users232 is is
asymmetrically disadvantageous to individuals. Simnilar to personal physicians and lawyers, SNSs
relationship with users presupposes contractual duties.233
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CONCLUSION
Recasting personal data as property and revising the role of SNSs as bailess avoids the
prickly path of complex constitutional considerations234 and accurately accounts for encapsulates
the science already existing in their symbiotic relationship. To further entice SNSs to shift their
role and reshape their relationship with users, some scholars have proposed regulations affording
the platforms greater constitutional protections, particularly preempting the patchwork of state
privacy laws.235
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